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Abstract
The long-standing impossibility of reaching agreement re-
stricts the lifespan of blockchains. In fact, most blockchains
are doomed to fail in a sufficiently long execution because
they either fork as soon as a third of the replicas are Byzantine
or they offer a probability of success that decreases with the
number of blocks agreed upon.
In this paper, we propose the first Longlasting Blockchain
system, LLB, that relies on the deceitful failure model where
most replicas are either incentivized to foment a coalition and
steal assets or rewarded to participate correctly. LLB either
reaches consensus or slashes deceitful replicas to obtain n′
remaining replicas among which f ′ < n′/3 are faulty. As a
result, even with an overwhelmingly high number of deceitful
faults, LLB always recovers from transient disputes, or forks,
to a consistent state deterministically agreed by all honest
replicas. We demonstrate the effectiveness of LLB in a zero
loss payment system application that outperforms the raw
state machine replication at the heart of Facebook’s Libra
blockchain starting from 60 geodistributed replicas.
1 Introduction
Blockchain systems are promising as secure distributed plat-
forms to track the ownership of assets [34,39]. They typically
require replicas to agree on a unique block to be appended
at each index of the chain. Unfortunately, the inherent im-
possibility to solve consensus indicates that blockchains are
doomed to fail: some blockchains fork if blocks take too long
to be propagated to the network [35], after repeating many
times a probabilistic attempt [42], or if the number of arbi-
trary failures exceeds n/3 [17]. If these forks persist, then
thefts can occur through double spending or the legitimacy
of the blockchain is questioned as in the case of Ethereum
Classic (ETC) vs. Ethereum (ETH) or Bitcoin Classic (BXC)
vs. Bitcoin (BTC).
In this paper, we propose a dynamic deceitful failure model
for payment system (cf. Table 1), that differs radically from
behavior Byzantine omission comission alive-but-corrupt
benign 3 3 3 7
deceitful 3 7 3 3
honest 7 7 7 3
Table 1: The behavior matrix that relates our behavior defi-
nition i to an existing fault j such that ai, j =3⇔ i∩ j 6=∅;
e.g., sending a wrongly formatted message is a commission
fault and a benign fault; a replica whose coalition is too small
to violate safety is alive-but-corrupt and honest.
the classic distributed system failure models [11, 24, 30, 31].
As opposed to datacenters [11], cloud services [30] or dis-
tributed databases [24] where commission faults are gen-
erally due to unlucky and unfrequent events (e.g., disk er-
rors [11]), distributed payment systems are more subject to
well-fomented coalition attacks so as to influence the deci-
sion of honest replicas [19, 26]. In addition, if not deceitful,
blockchain service providers are more likely up and running
than crashed: they are carefully monitored to generate finan-
cial rewards to their owner. We thus distinguish two new
classes of faults depicted in Table 1: (i) deceitful faults that
directly affect safety (e.g., sending correctly formatted mes-
sages with malicious content to influence the execution of
honest replicas) and (ii) benign faults that do not risk to vio-
late safety (e.g., omission faults, unintelligible messages or
out-of-date well-formated messages).
Based on this model, we propose the first Longlasting
Blockchain (LLB) by offering deterministic guarantees and
ensuring that some inevitable inconsistencies will be resolved
in a partially synchronous model [16]. To be longlasting,
our blockchain detects the predominant deceitful replicas to
exclude them. The same predominance of deceitful faults
implies that less than n/6 benign faults and less than 2n/3
deceitful faults guarantee the system progresses. If a disagree-
ment is reached then n/3 replicas are detected and the slashing
phase runs by having honest replicas executing another con-
sensus to exclude the deceitful replicas from the upcoming
consensus instances. When sufficiently many deceitful faulty
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replicas are excluded, the system reaches a state of n′ remain-
ing replicas among which f ′ < n′/3 are Byzantine where
consensus is guaranteed, hence resolving the past disputes. To
evaluate LLB, we build a payment system where no fungible
assets can be double spent. It guarantees that honest nodes
never lose their assets for any number of failures. Note that
we rely on the assumption of partial synchrony to bypass the
impossibility of solving consensus [20] deterministically. As
opposed to classic blockchains [34,39] where recovering from
forks a posteriori is the norm, our LLB guarantees determinis-
tic agreement in good executions but recovers only in unlucky
cases. As opposed to more recent Byzantine fault tolerant
blockchains [21], it recovers from a state where f ≥ n/3 have
been corrupted.
To evaluate our system, we implemented a coalition attack
of up to d 2n3 e−1 replicas that coordinate deceitful faults to
mislead honest replicas. It consists of leading honest repli-
cas to a bivalent state, which makes Byzantine consensus
impossible [26], by sending distinct binary values to different
partitions of honest replicas while delaying the communi-
cation between the partitions. Once each honest replica of
a partition receives messages with the same value v from a
supermajority of distinct replicas, it decides this value. The
deceitful faults are for the same Byzantine replicas to send
sufficiently distinct values to the two honest partitions to guar-
antee that they disagree. Interestingly, our results demonstrate
that the system robustness increases with the size of the sys-
tem as the increasing latency helps honest replicas detect an
attack before disagreeing.
LLB presents various limitations. First, to hold nodes
accountable for their actions, we need an expensive cryp-
tographic primitive that adds up to the CPU demand of
blockchain systems and cannot be minimized with thresh-
old encryption or message authentication codes. Despite this,
we show that the throughput scales on simple 4 vCPU ma-
chines (§5) to outperform, starting from 60 nodes, the Hot-
Stuff raw state machine replication [32] at the heart of the
Libra blockchain [18]. Second, LLB cannot guarantee termi-
nation when 2n/3≤ f ≤ n, hence even though no assets are
lost, the system risks to stop being available. Third, the zero
loss payment system does not imply full satisfaction of the
honest client users: Consider that a user thinks she succeeds
in buying a rare item, say Guernica by Picasso, she might
be disappointed when she realizes (even though she was not
charged) that due to a transient fork someone else acquired it.
We present the background (§2), our problem (§3), our LLB
solution (§4), our evaluation (§5) and the payment system
application (§6) before presenting the related work (§7) and
concluding (§8).
2 Background
A blockchain system [34] is a distributed system maintain-
ing a sequence of blocks that contains transactions indicating
how assets are exchanged between accounts. It relies on the
existence of a public key infrastructure so that each user is
equipped with a private-public key pair that allows them to
withdraw assets from their account by sending a signed trans-
action request to some servers, called replicas, providing the
blockchain service.
Failure models. In traditional distributed systems [11, 24,
30], Byzantine failures [36] are typically classified into omis-
sion faults, when omitting messages, and commission faults,
when wrong messages are sent [11]. Their environment gen-
erally relies on an isolated network and the rare commission
faults are due to unlucky events (e.g., disk error [11]) rather
than intrusions. For example, Eve [24] requires an upper-
bound on the number of commission faults to guarantee cor-
rectness of database requests and Depot [30] offers a cloud
service with a stronger guarantee than fork-join consistency
when all faults are omission faults. The BAR model [1] con-
siders a more open environment of multiple administrative
domains vulnerable to malicious intents and rational behav-
iors.
Blockchains are also exposed to malicious intents and ra-
tional behaviors when they operate over an open network.
First, the more a provider offers the service the more it is
rewarded [34]. Second, hackers try to double spend valuable
assets by colluding [19] in making honest replicas disagree.
Motivated by blockchains, Flexible BFT [32] introduces a
static adversary that determines which replica is Byzantine
or alive-but-corrupt for the whole execution. An alive-but-
corrupt replica only tries to disrupt the safety of the system
if it can, otherwise (for example if its coalition is too small)
it executes honestly. Our model differs from Flexible BFT
by being dynamic as honest replicas can be bribed between
two consensus instances. Our deceitful replica is similar to an
alive-but-correct replica except that it can try to disrupt the
safety of the system in any case, as depicted in Table 1.
Proof-of-stake and slashing. Recent blockchains [6, 21]
offer a proof-of-stake (PoS) alternative to select a subset of
nodes based on the amount of assets they own, to run the
consensus protocol [21]. In some PoS variants, the replicas
need to deposit assets in an escrow account before they can
participate in the consensus. In addition to potential rewards,
Casper [6] provides a slashing mechanism to withdraw a
penalty from the deposit of a replica that double votes [6],
however, Casper does not prevent voters from balancing their
votes among proposals so Casper does not solve consensus.
Accountability. The replicas of a blockchain system are,
by default, not accountable in that their deceitful faults of-
ten go undetected. For example, when a deceitful replica
creates a fork, he manages to double spend after one of the
branches where it spent coins vanishes. This prevents other
replicas from detecting this misbehavior in order to hold this
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deceitful replica accountable for its actions. Turning a con-
sensus algorithm into an accountable one without assuming
synchrony [16] is not trivial. There are well-known general
techniques, like PeerReview [23], that offer accountability
over any distributed system, however, this general solution
requires Byzantine replicas to share their log, so, under par-
tial synchrony [16], it can only suspect these replicas for-
ever. Another approach is for the consensus algorithm to be
changed so that each message sent should be justified with
the causal past of authenticated messages themselves justi-
fied. The resulting exponential complexity is not practical.
Recently, Polygraph [9] introduced accountable consensus
(Definition 1) as the problem of solving consensus if f < n/3
and detecting eventually fd ≥ n/3 fraudsters responsible for
a disagreement. It offers a solution that consists of associ-
ating each decision with a certificate that consists of 2n/3
messages received from distinct replicas to justify a decision.
Its communication complexity is O(n5). We use Polygraph to
detect deceitful replicas in case of disagreement.
Definition 1 (Accountable Consensus). The problem of ac-
countable consensus is to solve consensus when the number
of Byzantine faults does not exceed n/3 and for every honest
replica to eventually output at least fd = dn/3e fraudsters if
two honest replicas output distinct decisions.
Byzantine state machine replication. A Byzantine State
Machine Replication (SMR) [8, 25, 41] is a replicated service
that accepts deterministic commands from clients and totally
orders these commands using a consensus protocol so that
upon execution of these commands, every honest replica ends
up with the same state. The instances of the consensus execute
in sequence, one after the other, starting from index 0. We
refer to the instance at index i as Γi.
Traditionally, provided honest replicas propose a value, the
Byzantine consensus problem [36] is for every honest replica
to eventually decide a value (consensus termination), for no
two honest replicas to decide different values (agreement)
and for the decided value to be one of the proposed values
(validity). In this paper, we consider however a variant of the
Byzantine consensus useful for blockchains [13] where the
agreement and termination remain unchanged but the validity
requires that the decided value is a subset of the union of the
proposed values. It is inspired by consensus definitions where
multiple values can be decided [3,15,26] and where decisions
are verified [7].
Definition 2 (Set Byzantine Consensus). Assuming that each
honest replica proposes a proposal, the Set Byzantine Con-
sensus (SBC) problem is for each of them to decide on a set
in such a way that the following properties are satisfied:
• SBC-Termination: every honest replica eventually decides
a set of transactions;
• SBC-Agreement: no two honest replicas decide on different
sets of transactions;
• SBC-Validity: a decided set of transactions is a non-
conflicting set of valid transactions taken from the union of
the proposed sets; and if all replicas are honest and propose
a common valid non-conflicting set of transactions, then this
set is the decided set.
SBC-Validity includes two predicates, the first states that
transactions proposed by Byzantine proposers could be de-
cided as long as they are valid or correctly signed and non
conflicting; the second one is necessary to prevent any trivial
algorithm that decides a pre-determined value from solving
the problem. As a result, we consider that a consensus in-
stance Γi outputs a set of enumerable decisions out(Γi) =
di, size(di) ∈N that all n replicas replicate. We refer to the
state of the SMR at the i-th consensus instance Γi as all de-
cisions of all consensus instances up to the i-th consensus
instance.
3 The Longlasting Blockchain Problem
Like in [8, 25], we consider the classic distributed system
model of n replicas, f of which can be Byzantine or fail in an
arbitrary way, each of them identified by an identifier pi ∈ I
where I is the set of identifiers. These replicas communicate
through a partially synchronous network, hence there exists
an upper-bound on the time it takes to deliver a message, but
this bound is unknown [16].
A Longlasting Blockchain (LLB) is a Byzantine SMR that
runs despite the presence of an overwhelming number f of
Byzantine faults that aim at stealing assets. As consensus
is impossible without synchrony as soon as f ≥ n/3, LLB
allows for some consensus instances to reach a disagreement
before fixing the disagreement by merging the branches of
the resulting fork and deciding the union of all the past deci-
sions using the set consensus (Definition 2). More formally,
an SMR is an LLB if it ensures recovery, awareness and ter-
mination as defined below:
Definition 3 (LLB). An SMR is an LLB if it ensures the three
following properties:
Property 1 (Recovery). If a disagreement occurs at Γk, then
there exists Γ`, with `> k, where consensus is reached and dis-
agreeing decisions of Γk are all decided, out(Γk)⊆ out(Γ`).
Property 2 (Awareness). There exists k such that for all
larger index ` > k, consensus Γ` is reached and honest repli-
cas become eventually aware of it.
Property 3 (Termination). Every consensus instance termi-
nates, hence for all k > 0, Γk terminates.
While recovery helps guarantee that assets of honest par-
ticipants are not lost, it is interesting to consider a stronger
property than recovery that ensures that all honest replicas can
detect precisely when the consensus occurred, namely aware-
ness. To illustrate why recovery does not imply awareness,
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consider that initially n = 10 and f = 6. Consider an account-
able consensus protocol that detects fd = d n3e= 4 deceitful
replicas and a slashing protocol that excludes these replicas
in that they cannot participate in subsequent consensus in-
stances. The subsequent consensus instances will execute
among n′ = n− fd = 6 replicas among which f ′ = f − fd = 2
are faulty. Hence, the number f = n/3 of Byzantine repli-
cas cannot guarantee that the subsequent consensus instance
succeeds [26], hence the need for awareness.
Byzantine adversary with deceitful faults. An adversary
A controls Byzantine replicas. It can read, create and delay
any message but it cannot drop messages. Like in classic
blockchain models (§2), we assume the presence of a public
key infrastructure and A cannot forge signatures. The adver-
sary is dynamic in that f can change over time, however, we
assume that between a consensus is invoked and it is con-
firmed or fixed, f does not change. Note that n also depends
on time, however, we omit the time parameter for simplicity.
A deceitful fault consists of sending a message that vio-
lates the protocol to deceive honest replicas and try to reach a
disagreement. More precisely, given a Byzantine consensus
protocol, the deceitful fault corresponds to the behavior that
if followed by a coalition of sufficiently many replicas would
lead to a disagreement. Of course, the deceitful replicas may
not know whether the coalition will be large enough to lead
to disagreement and may adopt this behavior anyway. This
model mimics the behavior of hackers that try to steal the
assets of blockchains: they are incentivized to run a carefully
fomented attack for this purpose. If they fail to do so, say
because they could not bribe a sufficiently large coalition to
execute their hacked protocol, then they have no interest in
preventing the system from progressing, as they may want to
retry their attack later. These faults are specific to the consid-
ered consensus protocol and usually involve more than n/3
replicas equivocating by sending distinct messages to two
partitions of honest replicas so that the first partition (resp. the
second partition) cannot distinguish this execution from an-
other where they reach agreement on v (resp. on v′ 6= v) [20].
We refer to a replica that commits a deceitful fault as a
deceitful replica. Any Byzantine fault that is not a deceitful
fault is a benign fault and a benign replica is a Byzantine
replica that does not commit a deceitful fault. In the remainder,
we refer to the number of benign replicas as q and to the
deceitful ratio ( f −q)/n as δ. A replica that is not Byzantine
is honest.
4 Description of the Longlasting Blockchain
In this section we detail our system. Its two main ideas are to
slash fraudsters responsible for a fork to converge towards a
state where consensus can be reached and, once consensus can
be reached, to decide transactions by funding the conflicting
ones that were wrongly decided. We will show that LLB
solves the longlasting blockchain problem either when f <
n/2 and q < n/3 or when f < 5n/9 and q < 2n/9, while
it partially solves this problem for any greater values of f
and q, as we will show in Table 2. As depicted in Figure 1,
we present below the components of our system, namely the
ASMR (§4.1) and the LLB (§4.2) but we defer the description
of the payment system (§6).
Longlasting Blockchain
Accountable SMR
Zero-loss Payment System
replica pi
Consensus
t=A      B
b=tx-batch
propose(b)
decision(b,b’…)
detected
fraud(k)
refund(B)
slash(pk)
Longlasting Blockchain
Accountable SMR
Zero-loss Payment System
replica pj
b’=tx-batch detected
fraud(k)
refund(B)
slash(pk)
propose(b’)
decision(b,b’…)
$1M t’=A      C$1M
Network
Consensus
send(*) recv(*) send(*) recv(*)
Figure 1: The distributed architecture of our system relies on
ASMR, LLB and the payment system deployed on several
replicas. Each replica batches some payment requests illus-
trated with a transfer t (resp. t ′) of $1M from Alice’s account
(A) to Bob’s (B) (resp. Carol’s (C)). Consider that Alice has
$1M initially and attempts to double spend by modifying the
code of a replica pk under her control so as to execute the
coalition attack. The ASMR component detects the deceitful
replica pk that tried to double spend, the associated transac-
tions t and t ′ and account A with insufficient funds. It notifies
LLB that slashes replica pk and refund B with pk’s deposit.
As long as new requests are submitted by a client to a
replica, the payment system component of the replica converts
it into a payment that is passed to the LLB component. When
sufficiently many payments are present, the LLB issues a
batch of requests to the ASMR that, in turn, proposes it to the
consensus component, which exchanges messages though the
network for agreement among honest replicas to be reached.
If a disagreement is detected, then the account of the deceitful
replica is slashed. Consider that Alice (A) attempts to double
spend by spending her $1M with both Bob (B) and Carol (C)
in t and t ′, respectively, and hacking the code of replica pk
that commits deceitful faults for disagreement to occur. Once
the ASMR detects the disagreement, LLB is notified, which
results in slashing the replica pk both by excluding it from
the ASMR and funding B with pk’s deposit (Figure 1).
4.1 Accountable SMR (ASMR)
In this section, we present our ASMR that consists of run-
ning an infinite sequence of five consecutive actions: À the
accountable consensus (Def. 1) that tries to decide upon a new
set of transactions, Á a confirmation that aims at confirming
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Instance 𝛤k
ASMR consensus confirmation pof consensus slashing
disagreement
found
upon
decision
agreement on
fraudsters
upon
request
fraudsters
removed
decisions
combined
upon
request
upon
decision
reconcile2 3 4 5 ASMR consensus
optionaltime Instance 𝛤k+1
1 1
Figure 2: If there are enqueued requests that wait to be served, then a replica starts a new instance Γk by participating in an
ASMR consensus phase À; a series of optional phases may follow: Á the replica tries to confirm this decision to make sure
no other honest replica disagrees, Â it invokes a proof-of-fraud (PoF) consensus if it finds PoF of conflicting decisions, Ã it
then slashes the deceitful replicas identified by these PoFs and Ä merges the two batches of decided transactions. Some of these
phases complete upon consensus termination (in black) whereas other phases terminate upon simple notification reception (in
grey). The replica starts a new instance Γk+1 if there are other enqueued requests to be served, hence participating in a new
ASMR consensus phase À that may succeed, in which case none of the optional phases immediately follow.
that the agreement was reached, Â–Ã a slashing that aims at
excluding deceitful replicas responsible for a disagreement
and Ä a reconciliation phase that combines all the disagree-
ment decisions, as depicted in Figure 2.
The phases of ASMR. We present in more details the five
phases executed by ASMR at each new index. First, it runs the
accountable consensus to try to agree on a set of transactions,
then it optionally runs the four subsequent phases to recover
from the possible disagreement.
À ASMR consensus phase: Honest replicas propose a set
of transactions, which they received from clients, to the
accountable consensus (Def. 1) in the hope to reach
agreement. When the consensus terminates (cf. Theo-
rem 4.3), all honest replicas agree on the same decision
or different honest replicas disagree: they decide distinct
sets of transactions.
Á Confirmation phase: As correct replicas could be un-
aware of the other decisions and may not detect a dis-
agreement, they enter a confirmation phase waiting for
messages coming from more distinct replicas than what
consensus requires in order to learn about any possible
conflicting decisions (cf. Theorem 4.1). If the confirma-
tion leads honest replicas to detect distinct decisions,
i.e., they have received two correctly justified decided
batches for the same consensus instance, then they can
start the proof-of-fraud (PoF) consensus.
Â PoF consensus: Honest replicas start the proof-of-fraud
(PoF) consensus for any decision that is not yet con-
firmed if there exists a number fd = dn/3e of fraudsters
that are discovered. This is achieved through accountabil-
ity by cross-checking the set of received signed messages
(§2) that serve as unfalsifiable proofs-of-fraud (PoFs).
Honest replicas might have distinct PoFs at the end of
the ASMR consensus, this is the reason why another
consensus is needed to agree upon a unique list of PoF
that leads deterministically to the same list of fraudsters
to slash.
Ã Slashing phase: Once the consensus on the same list
of fraudsters is reached, the fraudsters are excluded
from the set of replicas that participate in the consensus.
Note that PoF consensus could instead wait for a single
fraudster before starting, however, waiting for at least
fd = d n3e allows us to exclude more replicas at once,
hence leaving an undesirable state where 5n/9 ≤ f <
2n/3. More generally, as the number of nodes n drops
to n′ = n−d n3e and the number of fraudsters f drops
to f ′ = f −d n3e, the deceitful ratio δ = ( f − q)/n also
decreases (strictly monotonically) to δ′ = ( f ′− q)/n′.
Note that as the preceding PoF consensus is accountable,
it may lead to an extra confirmation followed by another
PoF consensus if a PoF disagreement is reached, hence
the arrow from Ã to Á on Figure 2.
Ä Reconciliation: Once the slashing phase finishes, the
proportion of deceitful faults is guaranteed to have
dropped and the reconciliation starts by combining all
transactions that were decided by distinct honest replicas
in the preceding disagreement. These transactions are
ordered through a deterministic function, whose simple
example is a lexicographical order but can be made fair
by rotating over the indices.
Once the current instance Γk terminates, another instance
Γk+1 can start, even if it runs concurrently with a confirmation
or a slashing phase at index k.
Let c denote the required number of distinct replicas from
which a replica needs to receive replies in order to confirm
a decision. If a replica receives enough decisions from other
replicas to confirm theirs, then we know that it either con-
firms it or else it will find a disagreement and slash provably
deceitful replicas as stated in Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.1 (Confirmation). Consider an execution in
which an ASMR is about to execute a consensus instance
Γi, which tolerates less than t0 ·n failures, where t0 ∈ (0,1).
If a correct replica delivers c> t0 ·n+( f −q) decisions from
other replicas, it will either confirm its decision or start a PoF
consensus.
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Additionally, one can show that c is determined by f with
the following equation c> n/3+ f if f ≥ n/3, while c≥ 2n/3
if f < n/3. As a result, f −d n3e represents the additional num-
ber of honest replicas that one needs a reply from to confirm
its decision, compared to the amount of replies required to
decide. This is consistent with the impossibility result of
Byzantine consensus when f can be more than d n3e [36], giv-
ing c = 2n/3 and thus a decision is confirmed immediately.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is deferred to the appendix (§A).
Algorithm 1 PoF consensus and slash at replica pi
1: State:
2: Γk , kth instance of ASMR consensus pi participates to with field:
3: proc⊂ I, the set of participating replicas not proved deceitful yet
4: pofs, the set of proofs-of-fraud (PoFs), initially ∅
5: cons-pofs, the set of PoFs output by consensus, initially ∅
6: fraudster ∈ I, the identity of an agreed fraudster, initially ∅
7: fd , the threshold of proofs-of-fraud to recover, dn/3e by default
8: Upon receiving a list of proofs-of-fraud _pofs:
9: if (verify(_pofs)) then B if PoFs are correctly signed
10: pofs.add(_pofs) B add PoFs on distinct replicas
11: if (size(pofs)≥ fd) then B enough to start slashing
12: if pending Γk then v← Γk.stop() B it may violate agreement
13: cons-pofs← Γk.pof-propose(pofs) B run PoF consensus
14: for all pof in cons-pofs do B for all decided PoFs
15: if verify(_pof ) then B check that decided PoF is correct
16: fraudster← pof .get-fraudster() B get fraudster
17: detected-fraud(fraudster) B application punishment
18: pofs← pofs\{pof} B discard the treated pofs
19: Γk.proc← Γk.proc\{fraudster} B exclude fraudster
20: if Γk is stopped then Γk.propose(v) B restart cons.
Protocol to slash deceitful replicas. The PoF consensus
and slashing procedure depicted in Algorithm 1 consists of ac-
cumulating sufficiently many valid proofs-of-fraud (PoFs) be-
fore executing an algorithm that solves the Set Byzantine Con-
sensus algorithm (Definition 2) at line 13 to decide, among
honest replicas, upon the set of all PoFs that the propose
function returns. The state of the algorithm consists of: the
current consensus instance Γi, a set of proof-of-frauds PoFs,
the fraudsters replica ids among the whole set proc of repli-
cas, a threshold fd of detected deceitful replicas and a set
cons-profs of decided PoFs. Each PoF is valid if there is a
conflict between messages authenticated by the same replica
(line 9) and the consensus is spawned once the number of
these valid PoFs exceeds the threshold fd of detected fail-
ures at line 11. After this information is reliably stored for
later retrieval, the fraudsters can be punished by notifying the
application layer (line 17) about the removed replicas.
It is important to note that when fd nodes are detected, the
potential ongoing consensus instance, must be restarted as it
may be doomed to fail; this is the reason why it is first stopped
(line 12) before being restarted with the new set of remaining
(i.e., non-excluded) replicas at line 20. Note that it is important
to re-verify that the PoFs are valid after the consensus outputs
them as some might be invalid or have already been treated
in the past: in particular, some of the deceitful replicas could
have already been excluded (and removed from the replicas).
Instead of waiting for d 2n3 e signed messages from distinct
replicas as it is done in the ASMR consensus, we only wait for
d n′2 e signed messages from distinct replicas, where n′= n− fd ,
in the PoF consensus. The reason is that this is sufficient to
ensure termination and a safety violation would not have
a dramatic impact on the application since proofs-of-fraud
are verified locally by each correct replica. Correct replicas
should still accept certificates with signatures from slashed
replicas in consensus instances that follow the slashing as
long as the deceitful ratio remains δ < 2/3. This transient
acceptance allows these correct replicas to decide in these
subsequent consensus instances.
4.2 Longlasting Blockchain (LLB)
In this section, we present Longlasting Blockchain (LLB),
a new open permissioned blockchain based on ASMR. It
features a mechanism to merge forks when they are detected
by funding conflicting transactions that have irrevocable side-
effects. Once a fork is identified, the conflicting blocks are
not discarded as it would be the case in classic blockchains
when a double spending occurs. Instead the blocks are merged.
In §6, we discuss how to cope with conflicting transactions,
as the ones of a payment system.
Similarly to Bitcoin [34], LLB accepts transaction requests
from a permissionless set of participants. In particular, this
allows participants to use different devices or wallets to issue
distinct transactions withdrawing from the same account—a
feature that is not offered in payment systems without con-
sensus [12]. In contrast with Bitcoin, our system does not
incentivize all participants to take part in trying to decide
upon every block, instead a restricted set of permissioned
replicas have this responsibility for a given block. From this
point-of-view, LLB is an open permissioned blockchain.
Guaranteeing consistency across replicas. It is impossi-
ble to ensure the uniqueness of a block at a given index of
the chain if f ≥ n/3 due to the impossibility of solving con-
sensus [36]. We thus implement a block merge in order to
resolve forks when they appear. As depicted in Figure 3, the
blockchain can fork if f ≥ n/3, at which point the system
reached a bivalent state where two honest replicas disagree:
they decide distinct values for the same consensus instance.
We defer the details of this attack to §C. This bivalent (resp.
multivalent) state leads to a blockchain fork with two (resp.
multiple) branches in the blockchain implementation based
on such an SMR.
LLB builds upon the slashing of ASMR in order to recover
from forks. It relies on the Polygraph accountable Byzantine
consensus [9] in order to detect fd fraudsters but optimizes
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Figure 3: LLB moves from a deceiptful failure ratio δ =
( f − q)/n ≥ 1/3 Ì where consensus cannot be reached to
a deceiptful failure ratio δ′ = ( f ′ − q)/n′ < 1/3 Ê where
consensus is reached; or from a deceiptful failure ratio 5/9≤
δ< 2/3 Í either indirectly to a ratio δ′ = ( f ′−q)/n′ < 1/4
Ë or directly to a ratio δ′ = ( f ′−q)/n′ < 1/3Ê, both leading
to a single branch where agreement is reached (until the next
bribery attack succeeds).
its verifications by using ECDSA instead of RSA to save
bandwidth and CPU while reaching the same security level.
In particular, the fact that ASMR slashes fd deceitful replicas
each time a disagreement occurs guarantees that the ratio of
deceitful replicas δ = ( f − q)/n converges to a state where
consensus is guaranteed. The maximum number of branches
that can result from forks depends on the number of benign
faults q and deceitful faults f − q as indicated in the theo-
rem below proved in §A. Note that Lemma 4.2 relies on the
bound aUP ≤ n−( f−q)(1−t0)n−( f−q) that was shown previously [37]
and restarted in the appendix (Lemma A.1).
Lemma 4.2 (Number of branches). Consider an execution
in which ASMR is about to execute a consensus instance
Γi, which tolerates strictly less than t0 · n, t0 ∈ (0,1) fail-
ures, and a slash that leads to UP honest replicas that up-
dated their set of replicas and OP outdated honest repli-
cas that did not update their set of replicas yet, meaning
n = f + |OP|+ |UP|. The maximum amount a of branches
that faulty replicas can create is a ≤ |OP|(1−t0)n−( f−q) + aUP,
for f − q ≥ (a−aUP)(1−t0)n−|OP|a−aUP , where aUP is the number of
branches that the remaining deceitful replicas can create after
the slashing phase.
Figure 3 depicts four ratios of deceitful nodes that allow
them to create a corresponding maximum number of branches
per fork: Ê if 0≤ δ< 1/3 then consensus is guaranteed and
this will persist until this ratio exceeds 1/3, which can happen
after some of the participants are bribed to misbehave; Ë if
1/3 ≤ δ < 1/2, then slashing fd replicas and merging two
blocks lead to a state where δ < 1/4 in which consensus is
also guaranteed to succeed; Ì if δ< 5/9, then the problem
becomes more delicate as more than two branches can occur
and some honest replicas may be unaware that some replicas
were slashed (cf. Lemma 4.2), continuing to use the outdated
branch; fortunately, they are guaranteed to learn about the two
updated branches and slashed replicas leading to the case Ê;
Í if 5/9 ≤ δ < 2/3, then deceitful replicas can create as
many as n− f branches (i.e., the number of honest replicas)
but again nodes learn about the updated branches which can
either lead them directly to Ê, if they are lucky in that they
identified more than fd deceitful replicas in a row, or to Ë,
where consensus will again be guaranteed to succeed.
Hence, after a series of concurrently running PoF consensus
and slashing phase, the system is guaranteed to fall back
to a state where the next consensus instance will succeed—
agreement will be reached—and all conflicting decisions will
be resolved (Alg. 2).
Algorithm 2 Block merge at replica pi
1: State:
2: Ω, a blockchain record with fields:
3: deposit, an integer, initially 0
4: inputs-deposit, a set of deposit inputs, initially in the first deposit
5: punished-acts, a set of punished account addresses, initially ∅
6: txs, a set of UTXO transaction records, initially in the genesis block
7: utxos, a list of unspent outputs, initially in the genesis block
8: Upon receiving conflicting block block: B merge block
9: for tx in block do B go through all txs
10: if (tx not in Ω.txs) then B check inclusion
11: CommitTxMerge(tx) B merge tx, go to line 17
12: for out in tx.outputs do B go through all outputs
13: if (out.account in Ω.punished-acts) then B if punished
14: PunishAccount(out.account) B punish also this new output
15: RefundInputs() B refill deposit, go to line 24
16: StoreBlock(block) B write block in blockchain
17: CommitTxMerge(tx):
18: toFund← 0
19: for input in tx.inputs do B go through all inputs
20: if (input not in Ω.utxos) then B not spendable, need to use deposit
21: Ω.inputs-deposit.add(input) B use deposit to refund
22: Ω.deposit←Ω.deposit− input.value B deposit decreases in value
23: else Ω.consumeUTXO(input) B spendable, normal case
24: RefundInputs():
25: for input in Ω.inputs-deposit do B go through inputs that used deposit
26: if (input in Ω.utxos) then B if they are now spendable
27: Ω.consumeUTXO(input) B consume them
28: Ω.deposit←Ω.deposit+ input.value B and refill deposit
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In memory transactions. LLB is a blockchain that inher-
its the same Unspent Transaction Output (UTXO) model as
Bitcoin [34]; the balance of each account in the system is
stored in the form of a UTXO table. In contrast with Bitcoin,
the number of maintained UTXOs is kept to a minimum in
order to allow in-memory optimizations. Each entry in this
table is a UTXO that indicates some amount of coins that a
particular account, the ‘output’ has. When a transaction trans-
ferring from source accounts s1, ...,sx to recipient accounts
r1, ...,ry executes, it checks the UTXOs of accounts s1, ...,sx.
If the UTXO amounts for these accounts are sufficient, then
this execution consumes as many UTXOs as possible and
produces another series of UTXOs now outputting the trans-
ferred amounts to r1, ...,ry as well as what is potentially left
to the source accounts s1, ...,sx. Maximizing the number of
UTXOs to consume helps keeping the table compact. Each
replicas can thus generally access the UTXO table directly in
memory for faster execution of transactions.
Protocol to merge blocks. As depicted in Alg. 2, the state
of the blockchain Ω consists of a set of inputs inputs-deposit
(line 4), a set of account addresses punished-acts (line 5) that
have been used by fraudsters, a deposit (line 3), that is used
by the protocol, a set txs of transactions and a list utxos of
UTXOs. The algorithm relies on a usual propagation of blocks
by broadcast on the network and starts upon reception of
a block that conflicts with an existing known block of the
blockhainΩ by trying to merge all transactions of the received
block with the transactions of the blockchainΩ (line 11). This
is done by invoking the function CommitTxMerge (lines 17–
23) where the inputs get appended to the UTXO table and
conflicting inputs are funded with the deposit (line 22). We
explain in §6 how to build a payment system with a sufficient
deposit to remedy double spending attempts.
Cryptographic techniques. To provide authentication and
integrity, we use cryptography. The transaction signatures are
implemented through the Elliptic Curves Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) with parameters secp256k1, as in Bit-
coin [34]. The network communications use gRPC between
clients and replicas and raw TCP sockets between replicas, but
all communication channels are encrypted through SSL. Fi-
nally, the slashing protocol (Alg. 1) also makes use of ECDSA
for PoFs or authentifying the sender of messages responsible
for disagreement. One may think that message authentication
codes (MACs) or threshold encryption could be more efficient
alternatives to this classic public-key cryptosystem, however,
threshold encryption cannot be used to trace back the faulty
users as they are encoded in less bits than what is needed to
differentiate users, and MACs are insufficient to provide this
transferrable authentication [10].
fault tolerance recovery awareness termination awareness
Byzantine ( f ) benign (q) knowing q
0< f < n3 0< q≤ f 3 3 3 3
n
3 ≤ f < n2 0< q< n3 3 3 3 3
n
3 ≤ q≤ f 3 3 7 7
0< q< 2n9 3 3 3 3
n
3 ≤ f < 5n9 2n9 ≤ q< n3 3 3 3 7
n
3 ≤ q≤ f 3 3 7 7
0< q< n6 3 3 3 7
5n
9 ≤ f < 2n3 n6 ≤ q< n3 3 3 7 7
n
3 ≤ q≤ f 3 3 7 7
2n
3 ≤ f < n f +q< n and 3 3 7 7
f −q< 2n3
otherwise 7 7 7 7
Table 2: The guarantees offered by ASMR depends on the
number f of Byzantine failures the number q of benign fail-
ures, where f − q is thus the number of deceitful failures.
Note that the system is safe and live when f < 2n/3 as long
as q< n/6, which guarantees progress towards recovery.
4.3 Fault tolerance and intuition of the proof
Table 2 lists the guarantees that ASMR can offer, depending
on the number f of Byzantine failures and the number q of
benign faults. (Note that f − q is the number of deceitful
faults.) Although not guaranteed, nodes can be eventually
aware that the consensus terminated successfully by waiting
for sufficiently many messages as shown in Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.3 (Termination). Consider an execution in which
an ASMR is about to execute a consensus instance Γi, which
tolerates less than t0 ·n failures, where t0 ∈ (0,1). If f −q<
(1− t0)n and q< t0(n− f )1−t0 , then ASMR guarantees termination.
Notice that the recovery (that comprises the slashing, pun-
ishing of deceitful replicas and the block merging), only takes
place if correct replicas can guarantee that if there is a dis-
agreement they will eventually know it. We show in Theo-
rem 4.5 why ASMR guarantees recovery, while also slash-
ing provably malicious replicas, if and only if n > q+ f
and f − q < (1− t0)n. This means that if, for example,
f = 5n/6−1, and q = n/6, ASMR still guarantees recovery
and awareness.
Theorem 4.4 (Awareness). Let aOP be the possible number of
branches before the last recovery (aOP = 0 if no recovery took
place yet), and let aUP be the possible number of branches
after the last recovery that an honest replica terminated, then
the ASMR guarantees awareness if and only if it guarantees
that there will be a maximum number of recoveries after which
the number of outdated and updated branches will eventually
be aOP < 1 and aUP < 2.
Table 2 dedicates two columns for awareness depending
on whether correct replicas have an accurate estimate of the
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number q of benign faults. Note that we prove both cases
in Theorem 4.4, however, the number aUP of branches that
the remaining f − fd replicas can create after the recovery
vary. Additionally, our system provides accountability as long
as f −q< 2n/3 and q< n/3, which is resilient optimal [9].
Finally, all the bounds of the termination column of Table 2
follow from Theorem 4.3.
Theorem 4.5 (Block Merge and Slashing Correctness). Con-
sider an execution in which an ASMR is about to execute a
consensus instance Γi, which tolerates less than t0 ·n failures,
where t0 ∈ (0,1). Let the PoF consensus tolerate less than
t ′0n= n/2 benign failures, and let fd = (1−2t0)n be the num-
ber of PoFs correct replicas must collect to start a slashing
phase. Assume a set of deceitful replicas tried to cause dis-
agreement. The block merge and slashing will start for such
disagreement and eventually terminate, and there will be a
finite number of recursive PoF consensus after which one of
them will also guarantee safety, if and only if n> q+ f and
f −q< (1− t0)n.
5 Blockchain Experimental Evaluation
This section is dedicated to answer the following questions:
Does LLB offer practical performance in a geo-distributed
environment world-wide? What is the impact of a coalition
of up to 66 machines that attempt to double spend? How does
the performance compare with the deterministic state ma-
chine replication at the heart of Facebook Libra? We defer the
evaluation of a zero-loss payment system application to §6.
Experimental settings. To evaluate LLB, we compare its
performance to (i) HotStuff [41], the state machine replica-
tion with linear message complexity that is being integrated
in Facebook’s Libra [18]; (ii) Red Belly Blockchain [13]
whose performance scales to hundreds of nodes, and (iii) Poly-
graph [9] an accountable blockchain prototype that does not
slash participants and whose verification technique is not ac-
countable. We deploy these blockchains in two distributed
settings of c4.xlarge Amazon Web Services (AWS) instances
equipped with 4 vCPU and 7.5 GiB of memory: (i) a LAN
with up to 100 machines and (ii) a WAN with up to 90 ma-
chines. Note that in all experiments we set the number of
deceitful faults to f −q = d5n/9e−1 and the number of be-
nign faults to q = 0, unless specified otherwise. All error bars
represent the 95% confidence intervals and the plotted values
are averaged over 3 to 5 runs. All transactions are ~400-byte
Bitcoin transactions with ECDSA signatures [34].
LLB vs. HotStuff SMR, Red Belly and Polygraph. Fig-
ure 4 compares the throughput of ASMR as its number of
decisions per unit of time to the throughput of the original
Polygraph, Red Belly Blockchain and HotStuff in the only
setting these solutions tolerate, i.e., f < n/3. We tested this
Figure 4: Throughput of LLB (decisions and confirmations)
compared to that of Polygraph [9], HotStuff [41] and the Red
Belly Blockchain [13] for f = f0.
implementation with exactly the same configuration as Poly-
graph [9]: c4.xlarge machines deployed uniformly across 5
regions of two continents: California, Oregon, Ohio, Frankfurt
and Ireland, with 10,000 transactions per proposal.
We can observe that the peak throughput is naturally ob-
tained by the raw SMR HotStuff, as blockchains and account-
able solutions suffer from the verification needed that are ab-
sent from HotStuff. At larger scale, HotStuff becomes slower
because it commits only one of the proposed values, hence
confirming previous observations [38] and [40, Sect.8.3]. By
contrast, LLB becomes faster as the system size increases.
We only represented the number of decisions per second that
goes up to 16,626 tx/sec at 90 replicas as the number of
confirmations per second is very similar, i.e., 16,492 tx/sec.
More interestingly, Polygraph is also faster at small scale
than LLB because it requires t +1 verifications per transac-
tion where LLB requires 2t +1. After 40 nodes, Polygraph
becomes slower than LLB because its RSA verifications are
larger than our ECDSA signatures, consumes more bandwidth
and more CPU. Finally, Red Belly Blockchain offers con-
stantly better performance than LLB, which is due to its lack
of accountability: it does not require messages to piggyback
certificates to detect frauds. Despite this difference, the scala-
bility of LLB allows it to achieve comparable performance to
Red Belly at 90 nodes, committing 16,626 tx/sec compared to
18,717 tx/sec, indicating that the longlasting property comes
at a reasonable cost. The reason is that Red Belly is network
bound and at large scale LLB leverages more CPU resources
until it reaches the same network bottleneck as Red Belly.
How slashing mitigates coalition attacks. To evaluate the
longlasting property of LLB, we implemented a classic coali-
tion attack [20] that consists of (i) partitioning the honest repli-
cas and (ii) having deceitful replicas equivocate by sending
distinct estimate values to each partition during the consen-
sus execution. (Details of the coalition attack are deferred to
Appendix C.) For these experiments, we placed all machines,
of type c4.xlarge, in the same region, used private IPs, and
generated delays based on previous measurements [13,14,33].
Fig. 5(top) shows the amount of disagreeing proposals
generated by attackers for uniform delays of 200, 500 and
1000 milliseconds between partitions of honest replicas. We
automatically calculate the maximum amount of branches
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a variety of uniform delays (top) and for delays generated
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Figure 6: Total disagreements (#distinct decisions) per de-
ceitful faults, for a setting with 100 replicas and a 2-second
uniform delay between partitions.
that the size of deceitful faults can create (i.e., 3 branches
for f −q< 5n/9), create one partition of honest replicas for
each branch, and generate the delays between all partitions.
We can notice that our agreement property is scalable: the
greater the number of replicas, the harder for attackers to
cause disagreement, even if they preserve the same deceitful
ratio. This is caused by the increase in latency, which gives
more time for partitions to find out about the attackers.
To consider more realistic delays than uniform ones,
Fig. 5(bottom) depicts the total disagreeing proposals per
number of replicas for delays following a gamma distribu-
tion with parameters taken from previous work [14, 33], and
a distribution that randomly samples the latencies observed
between AWS regions [13]. It is easy to see that for realistic
network delays attackers can barely manage to generate a
single disagreement, let alone with an increasing number of
replicas.
Overwhelming deceitful ratios. Figure 6 depicts the im-
pact of increasing deceitful ratios. To this end, we consider
every adversarial size that increases the possible amount of
branches in a fork that attackers can create, for a setting with
100 replicas and a 2-second uniform delay between partitions.
As expected, a higher adversarial size means attackers can
generate slightly more disagreements.
Large network delays to maximize disagreements.
While LLB is quite resilient to attacks for realistic but not
catastrophic delays, attackers can wait and try to attack when
the network collapses for a few seconds between regions.
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Figure 7: Total disagreements (#distinct decisions) per num-
ber of replicas, for a variety of uniform delays.
Figure 8: Time to detect the d n3e fraudsters (left) and time to
terminate the slashing consensus (right), per delay distribution
and number of replicas, with f = d5n/9e−1.
Fig. 7 shows the amount of proposals attackers can disagree
on in a scenario like this, reaching up to 50 proposals for
a uniform delay of 10 seconds between partitions of honest
replicas.
Merging proposals upon recovery. Additionally, although
replicas can merge proposals that they receive concurrently
(i.e., without halting consensus), Table 3 shows the times to
locally merge block proposals for different number of transac-
tions per block, assuming all transactions conflict (worst-case).
It is clear that this time to merge blocks locally is negligible
compared to the time it takes to run the consensus algorithm.
Blocksize (txs) 100 1000 10000
Time (ms) 0.55 4.20 41.38
Table 3: Time to merge two blocks for different sizes with all
transactions conflicting.
Impact of delays on slashing and detection times. Fig-
ure 8 shows the time to detect fd = d n3e fraudsters, and the
time to run the PoF consensus, for a variety of delays and
number of replicas. Notice that if the first d n3e fraudsters are
committing frauds at the same time, the times to detect the
first fraudster and the first d n3e fraudsters overlap entirely. (We
detect all at the same time.) Also, for increasing delays, both
the time to detect and to recover increases.
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6 Application to Zero-Loss Payment System
In this section, we describe how LLB can be used to imple-
ment a zero-loss payment system where no honest replica lose
any coin. The key idea is to request the consensus participants
to deposit a sufficient amount of coins in order to spend, in
case of an attack, the coins of deceitful participants to avoid
any honest replica loss. In order to measure the expected im-
pact of a coalition attack succeeding with probability ρ in
forking LLB by leading a consensus to disagreement, we first
need to make the following assumptions:
1. Fungible assets. We assume that participants can transfer
assets (like coins) that are fungible in that one unit is inter-
changeable and indistinguishable from another of the same
value. An example of a fungible asset is a cryptocurrency.
We assume that an honest client does not issue conflicting
transactions, i.e., concurrent transactions that withdraw from
the same account.
2. Deposit refund per block. As in classic blockchains [34,
39], we upper-bound the amount of deposited coins that can
be refunded per block. Let s be the maximum number of
transactions per block. As the amount of coins that can be
spent per transaction is bounded, it follows that the amount
that is refunded per block is also upper bounded. We denote
the maximum amount of deposit per account that be can
refunded per block as `. This limit implies that transferring
any amount ¢ can be done in one block but there should
be an associated deposit of the same amount that cannot
be refunded in less than m = ¢/` blocks—a portion of the
deposit is refunded in each of these blocks. We denote m as
the depth of the attack. We show below that we ensure zero
loss when m≥ aρ1−ρ , where a is the number of branches.
3. Network control restriction. We need to prevent Byzan-
tine replicas from communicating infinitely faster than hon-
est replicas. More formally, let X1 (resp. X2) be the ran-
dom variables that indicate the time it takes for a mes-
sage between two replicas within the same partition (resp.
two honest replicas from different partitions). We have
E(X1)/E(X2) > ε, where ε > 0. Note that the definition
of X1 also implies that it is the random variable of the com-
munication time of either two honest replicas of the same
partition or two Byzantine replicas.
Theoretical analysis. We show that attackers always fund
at least as much as they steal, leading to zero loss. We con-
sider that a PoF consensus starts before a disagreement occurs
or does not start, which is safer than the general case. Out of
one attack attempt, the attacker may gain G coins by forking
or lose P coins as a punishment from the system. In case of
a successful attack, the system compensates the coin losses
using the deposit coins. The attack represents a Bernoulli trial
that succeeds with probability ρ. The random variable Y mea-
sures the number of attempts for the attack to be successful
and follows a geometric distribution with mean E(Y ) = 1−ρˆρˆ ,
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Figure 9: Left: Amount of branches (y axis) per number of
replicas (x axis) for different coalition sizes. Right: Minimum
depth of an attack for a zero-cost recovery.
where ρˆ= 1−ρ is the probability that the attack fails.
The gain of an attack depends on the amount of coins of the
coalition spent in a branches of a fork. That is, the maximum
gain of a successful attack is G · (a−1), where G is the sum
of all assets of the attacker coalition. We define the function
α : [0,m]∩Z→ [0,1] that, given an amount of consensus
instances, returns the percentage of total gain that is refunded
in that amount of instances. We consider that an attack tries
to steal an amount divisible by `, thus α(i) = im .
The expected gain and punishment for the attackers in a
disagreement attempt are as follows:
G(ρˆ) =(a−1) ·
(
P(Y ≥ m) ·G+
m
∑
i=0
P(Y = i) ·α(i) ·G
)
,
P (ρˆ) =
m
∑
i=0
P(Y = i) · (1−α(i)) ·G.
We refer to the expected deposit flux per attack attempt as
the difference ∆= P (ρˆ)−G(ρˆ) between the punishment and
the gain from an attack. Therefore, the deposit flux is:
∆=
(
1−a ·( m∑
i=0
P(Y = i) ·α(i)+ρm+1))G= g(a,ρ,m)G.
If ∆< 0 then a cost of G(ρˆ)−P (ρˆ) is incurred to the sys-
tem, otherwise the punishment is enough to fund the deposit,
so we have to ensure that ∆≥ 0, hence we are interested in
g(a,ρ,m)≥ 0:
1−a·
(
(1−ρ)
m
· ρ
(
mρm+1− (m+1)ρm+1)
(p−1)2
)
−a ·ρm+1≥ 0.
And recall that m≥ aρ1−ρ , hence we have:
1− (mρm+1− (m+1)ρm+1)−a ·ρm+1 ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ 1≥ ρ
which always holds for any a ≥ 2, hence guaranteeing that
∆ ≥ 0. We can conclude that LLB implements a zero-loss
payment system if the total amount to be refunded per account
from the deposit in a consensus instance is limited to `≤ C3m ,
where C is the total circulating supply, since attackers will
always lose at least as much as what they manage to steal.
The full proof is deferred to the appendix (§B).
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Theorem 6.1 (Zero Loss Payment System). Given ρ the prob-
ability of success of an attack, if m ≥ aρ1−ρ , then LLB imple-
ments a zero loss payment system.
Simulating the depth and width of a coalition attack.
Figure 9(left) indicates the maximum amount of branches
a that a coalition of size f can create in a disagreement, for
different values of f and n. It is specially interesting to ob-
serve that a coalition of less than n/2 replicas cannot generate
more than two branches. We note the asymptotical limits
indicating that, given its size, a coalition cannot create an-
other branch without an additional replica. Furthermore, The-
orem 4.2 shows that a deceitful ratio of less than 11/18 can
create at most 7 branches per fork.
Figure 9(right) shows the required amount of consecutive
consensus instances m for LLB to retrieve enough coins from
punishments to fund the block merge. The right figure shows
the value m per deceitful ratio δ. Notice how m grows linearly
with a, but exponentially with δ.
Experimental evaluation of the payment system. Taking
the experimental results of §5 and based upon our aforemen-
tioned theoretical analysis, Figure 10 depicts the expected
deposit flux for a variety of uniform communication delays
with f = d5n/9e−1 where ` is the maximum amount to be re-
funded per block. Again, we can see that the expected deposit
flux increases with the number of replicas, confirming the zero
loss property scales well. We can see that for lower uniform
delays we obtain zero loss at larger values `. Nonetheless, all
delays shown lead to zero loss for more than 90 replicas with
`≤ 50% of the total circulating supply. Although omitted in
the figure, our experiments showed that for a uniform delay of
5 or 10 seconds, restricting `= 1% still yields a non-negative
deposit flux. Nevertheless, if the network performs normally,
LLB is expected to be gainful for a large value of f , and
to actually benefit from attackers (i.e., obtaining more from
punishing them than they can steal by attacking).
7 Related Work
Several works have tried to circumvent the upper bound on
the number of Byzantine failures [36] to reach agreement.
Slashing. The idea of slashing the misbehaving replicas is
common in blockchains, however, there were no solutions to
provably detect them [5,6] until recently, when accountability
was directly introduced within the consensus protocol [9].
Tendermint [5] aims at slashing replicas, but its consensus is
not accountable and can at best suspect these replicas forever.
Casper [6], while safe, does not solve consensus termination
as one replica can always restart a new consensus instance
in a later layer of its directed acyclic graph. SUNDR [27]
requires clients to observe each other file modifications to
detect Byzantine failures, hence assuming that clients are
honest and can communicate directly. Polygraph [9] ensures
accountability but does not provide slashing.
Weak guarantees. It has been shown that consensus is
necessary to implement a cryptocurrency [22]. Some at-
tempts to replace consensus by reliable broadcast thus led
to make the assumption that no two clients can issue con-
flicting transactions [12]. However, reliable broadcast still
requires f < n/3 [4] that we alleviate here without making
the assumption. Zeno [37] guarantees eventual consistency by
decoupling requests into weak (i.e., requests that may suffer
reordering) and strong requests. It provides availability in
periods where f goes beyond n/3 by committing only weak
requests, that can later be reordered if a merge procedure was
required. Note that LLB could not be built upon Zeno be-
cause Zeno requires wrongly ordered transactions to be rolled
back, whereas blockchain transaction can have irrevocable
side effects like the shipping of some paid goods to the buyer.
BFT2F [28] offers fork* consistency, which forces the ad-
versary to keep correct clients in one fork only, while also
allowing accountability. Both solutions identify the maximum
number of branches of a fork that we restate in Lemma A.1,
however, they do not remove deceitful replicas.
Failures. Various non-blockchain systems already refined
the types of failures to strengthen guarantees. Clement et
al. [11] propose a system that supports n = 2u+ r+1 faults,
where u and r are the numbers of commission and omission
faults, respectively. They can either tolerate n/3 commission
faults or n/2 omission faults. Malkhi et al. [32] propose the
flexible BFT failure model and algorithms that support 2n/3−
1 alive-but-corrupt replicas. An alive-but-corrupt replica only
behaves maliciously when it can violate safety, but it behaves
correctly otherwise. This assumption is too strong for our
needs: in reality, it is difficult for a replica to detect whether its
coalition is large enough for its attack to succeed. Moreover,
flexible BFT proposes a protocol with more than n/3 alive-
but-corrupt replicas only if clients can upper bound Byzantine
replicas.
Some hybrid failure models tolerate crash failures and
Byzantine failures but prevent Byzantine failures from par-
titioning the network [29]. Others aim at guaranteeing that
well-behaved quorums are responsive [30] or combine crash-
recovery with Byzantine behaviors to implement reliable
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broadcast [2]. We are not aware of any deceitful failure model.
8 Conclusion
LLB is the first blockchain system that is longlasting. It builds
upon a new deceitful failure model specific to distributed pay-
ment systems where most replicas are incentivized to act
correctly or foment a coalition. Our evaluation demonstrates
that, starting at 60 nodes geodistributed on different conti-
nents, LLB outperforms the raw state machine replication
at the heart of the Facebook Libra blockchain. Future work
includes implementing a join function to add new nodes.
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A Proof of Correctness
In this section, we show the properties that can be satisfied
depending on the size of the adversary, summarized in Table 2.
Upper-bounding the number of fork branches. In the
theorem below, we compute the number a of branches Byzan-
tine replicas can create when causing a fork, depending on
the assumption on the size of the adversary, being a = 1 the
normal case with no disagreement. We show that, for the
case t0n = d n3e (i.e., the consensus tolerates up to d n3e− 1
faults), if f < n/3 then no fork is possible (i.e., only one
branch exists and a = 1), while 2 and 3 branches are possible
for f < n/2 and f < 5n/9, respectively. The maximum is
reached at d n3e branches for f < 2n/3, in which case there
is only one honest replica in each branch, assuming that all
Byzantines can be deceitful faults. Previous work already
showed this result [28, 37], however, our proof will be useful
for other theorems.
Lemma A.1. Consider an execution in which an ASMR is
about to execute a consensus instance Γi, which tolerates less
than t0 ·n failures, where t0 ∈ (0,1). The maximum number
of branches that the Byzantine replicas can create in a fork is
a≤ n−( f−q)(1−t0)n−( f−q) , for ( f −q)≥
(a(1−t0)−1)n
a−1 .
Proof. It is easy to see that the maximum is obtained for
one honest replica in each branch, which is clearly for f −
q = (1− t0)n, and this number of branches is a = t0n+ 1.
let |C| = n− ( f − q) be the number of replicas that are not
deceitful faults, and a the number of branches in a fork, |C|=
n− ( f −q) = ax+ r for some x. W.l.o.g. we assume |C| to be
divisible by a, i.e., r = 0. Then for the attackers to be able to
create a branches the following must hold:
( f −q)+ x ≥ (1− t0)n,
f −q≤ (1− t0)n−1,
ax = n− ( f −q).
Solving this system gives the following expression for f −q:
f −q≥ (a(1− t0)−1)n
a−1 , (1)
and for a:
a≤ n− ( f −q)
(1− t0)n− ( f −q) . (2)
Upper-bounding the number of detected replicas.
Lemma A.2 gives an upper-bound on the number fd of
proofs-of-fraud (of different replicas) that an honest replica
must collect in order to start a slashing phase. In particular,
for t0n = d n3e, an honest replica can wait for up to fd = d n3e
proofs-of-fraud, otherwise some disagreements do not cause
a slashing phase. This is possible as Polygraph [9] guarantees
that at least d n3e Byzantine replicas are eventually detected
after a disagreement occurs.
Lemma A.2. Consider an execution in which an ASMR is
about to execute a consensus instance Γi, which tolerates less
than t0 ·n failures, where t0 ∈ (0,1). If the ASMR guarantees
block merge and slashing then the number fd of proofs-of-
fraud that an honest replica must collect to start the slashing
consensus must be fd ≤ (1−2t0)n.
Proof. It is clear that fd must not be greater than the min-
imum amount of Byzantine replicas required to cause dis-
agreement, which we know from Lemma A.1 is, for a = 2,
f −q≥ (2(1− t0)−1)n ⇐⇒ f −q≥ (1−2t0)n. Therefore,
to guarantee that any disagreement leads to honest replicas
launching slashing fd provably deceitful replicas, the slash-
ing must start when honest replicas collect fd ≤ (1− 2t0)n
proofs-of-fraud, otherwise there may be disagreements that
do not lead to a slashing.
Notice however that if a disagreement takes place between
conflicting views on the set of honest replicas, then updated
honest replicas simply merge both decided values, effectively
removing more malicious nodes than fd . We explore further
cases when a disagreement during or after slashing is possible
in the next Lemma 4.2.
Upper-bounding the number of branches after the recov-
ery. The slashing phase guarantees that at least fd deceitful
replicas are punished and removed and that the number of
branches strictly decreases. However, depending on the adver-
sarial size, a PoF consensus and slash will be able to reduce
the number of branches to just one or multiple ones. For exam-
ple, for t0n = d n3e (i.e., the consensus tolerates n3 −1 faults),
if f < n/2 then the recovery merges all branches into one.
However, if f < 5n/9 then it is possible that some honest
replicas participate still in an outdated branch and are not
aware that the slashing of n/3 nodes resulted in a new thresh-
old f ′ < n′/3, while some other replicas participate in the
updated branch. Additionally, for f < 2n/3, there may be up
to two updated branches whose participants learn that the
slashing led to f ′ < n′/2, and as many outdated branches as
outdated replicas that do not know about the slashing.
Recall however that if more than one branch progress after
a slashing execution, a new execution of the slashing will
eventually start, punishing and removing more deceitful repli-
cas, and leading to honest replicas eventually converging to
one branch. For example, if 5/9 ≤ f/n < 2/3 initially (cf.
case with two updated branches in Fig. 3) , then after the first
slashing execution we obtain 1/3 ≤ f ′/n′ < 1/2 and after
the second slashing execution we obtain 0 ≤ f ′′/n′′ < 1/4
in which case consensus is solvable (cf. case with a single
branch in Fig. 3). Notice also that one recovery is enough to
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guarantee eventually converging to just one updated branch
for f < 5n/9, while awareness is only possible if f < n/2, or
for higher f upper-bounding the number of benign failures.
Lemma A.3 (Lemma 4.2). Consider an execution in which
ASMR is about to execute a consensus instance Γt0i , which tol-
erates strictly less than t0 ·n, t0 ∈ (0,1) failures, and a slash
that leads to UP honest replicas that updated their set of
replicas and OP outdated honest replicas that did not update
their set of replicas yet, meaning n = f + |OP|+ |UP|. The
maximum amount a of branches that faulty replicas can cre-
ate is a≤ |OP|(1−t0)n−( f−q)+aUP, for f −q≥
(a−aUP)(1−t0)n−|OP|
a−aUP ,
where aUP is the number of branches that the remaining de-
ceitful replicas can create after the slashing phase.
Proof. The value aUP of branches after the slash can be di-
rectly derived from Lemma A.1, so we explore the outdated
replicas. Since they are outdated, the removed deceitful repli-
cas can still participate with |OP| honest replicas, and also the
number of replicas that participate in the consensus of their
branch is n. Therefore, analogously to Lemma A.1, we ex-
plore for which values f −q+ |OP|/aOP ≥ (1− t0)n. Solving
this gives:
aOP ≤ |OP|
(1− t0)n− ( f −q)
and also:
f −q≥ aOP(1− t0)n−|OP|
aOP
Finally, making aOP = a−aUP to count the branch of updated
replicas gives the result.
Note that from Lemma A.2 we have fd ≤ (1− 2t0)n. It
is easy to see from Lemma 4.2 that a decreases with |OP|,
meaning also that a is minimized by maximizing the amount
of honest replicas that are in |UP|. Additionally, being q ≤
f − fd the amount of benign failures that the slashing must
tolerate, we have that n− f −( f − fd) = n+ fd−2 f ≤ |UP| is
the minimum number of honest replicas that must participate
in the PoF consensus for it to terminate, and thus |OP| ≤ f −
fd . What’s more, f − fd decreases when fd increases, and thus
the amount of honest replicas that must participate in the slash
for it to terminate increases, also minimizing a. Therefore,
when not specified we assume the system chooses to wait for
at least fd = (1−2t0)n roofs-of-fraud before launching the
slash, which gives the best fault tolerance.
Awareness. Theorem 4.4 shows in which cases an LSMR
can guarantee awareness. Informally, an honest replica can
detect that no more branches are possible if the relative size of
deceitful faults is smaller than a third of the remaining repli-
cas, and enough honest replicas confirm that they agree on the
remaining replicas. Notice that a disagreement on the output
of a recovery still requires fd removed replicas on each branch
and is eventually also merged, causing even more provably
deceitful replicas removed from the set n than fd . Thus we
obviate such better scenario, and focus on disagreement on
the consensus. For example, for t0n = d n3e, if f < n/2 and
q< n/3 then awareness is immediately guaranteed after one
recovery terminates.
Theorem A.4 (Theorem 4.4). Consider an execution in which
an ASMR is about to execute a consensus instance Γi, which
tolerates less than t0 · n failures, where t0 ∈ (0,1). Let aOP
be the possible number of branches before the last recovery
(aOP = 0 if no recovery took place yet), and let aUP be the
maximum possible number of branches after the last recovery
that an honest replica terminated, then the ASMR guarantees
awareness if and only if it guarantees that there will be a
maximum number of recoveries after which the number of
outdated and updated branches will eventually be aOP < 1
and aUP < 2.
Proof. First we prove the if. It is easy to see that, since all
branches a = aOP+aUP are the addition of the outdated plus
the updated ones, if aOP < 1 then not even one branch is
possible in the outdated partition, while aUP < 2 allows up
to 1 branch in the updated one. Now we prove the only if
by contradiction. Suppose we have awareness while either
aOP ≥ 1 or aUP ≥ 2 after all honest replicas have executed all
possible slashing phases. Since the total number of branches
is a = aOP +aUP, a must be a < 2, but that is only possible
if aOP is less than 1, and one of aUP is less than 2, which is a
contradiction.
Recovery. In general, our LLB guarantees recovery as long
as every branch of a fork has at least one honest replica partici-
pating in it, but it is only for some values of f that honest repli-
cas can be aware that the recovery has finished (awareness).
We show this in the following two lemmas. For instance, for
t0n= d n3e, if f −q< 2n/3, then after a recovery, the adversary
can still hold more than a third of relative power, meaning
they can still cause disagreements, including on the recovery
itself. Thanks to the PoF consensus also being accountable,
the more disagreements they cause the lower and lower the
deceitful ratio becomes, until it reaches strictly lower than a
third of the remaining replicas, when all honest replicas can
be sure that disagreements are no longer possible. Notwith-
standing, if Byzantine replicas commit benign failure once the
recovery starts, honest replica can not confirm their decisions
to be the only decisions, even if they actually are, meaning
they cannot guarantee awareness even if there is in fact just
one branch.
Theorem A.5 (Theorem 4.5). Consider an execution in which
an ASMR is about to execute a consensus instance Γi, which
tolerates less than t0 ·n failures, where t0 ∈ (0,1). Let the PoF
consensus tolerate less than t ′0n = n/2 benign failures, and
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let fd = (1−2t0)n the number of PoFs correct replicas must
collect to start a slashing phase. Assume a set of deceitful
replicas tried to cause disagreement. The block merge and
PoF consensus will start for such disagreement, and eventu-
ally terminate, and there will be a finite number of recursive
PoF consensus after which one of them will also guarantee
safety if and only if f −q< (1− t0)n and n> q+ f .
Proof. First we assume f − q < (1− t0)n. We consider the
deceitful ratio to be big enough to cause disagreement, i.e.,
f −q ≥ (1−2t0)n. Note that the relative size of the benign
faults takes it maximum when the LLB slashes all deceit-
ful faults, therefore we consider the worst-case of a slashing
phase that slashes all f −q deceitful faults. Let the number
of faults that the slashing consensus tolerates be less than
t ′0n, t
′
0 ∈ (0,1). we need to guarantee that t ′0(n− ( f −q))> q
to guarantee that correct replicas will form a certificate with
enough signatures, otherwise they will always wait for replies
from benign faults. Since t ′0n = n/2 (i.e., the recovery con-
sensus tolerates up to n/2− 1 benign faults), we have that
q< n− f ⇐⇒ n> f +q. Notice also from Lemma A.2 that
the recovery starts only once a correct replica collects enough
proofs-of-fraud to cause a disagreement, i.e., fd = (1−2t0)n.
Therefore, if f −q< (1−2t0)n the block merge and slashing
will not even be necessary. This guarantees termination of
the PoF consensus, the slash and the block merge. It is easy
to see that safety is also guaranteed, thanks to the account-
ability of the PoF consensus. If safety is attacked by some
remaining deceitful faults, a new slashing consensus starts.
This can happen only for a finite number of times, since every
new slashing slashes a non-zero number of newly discovered
deceitful faults. There will thus be one last slashing in the
recursive iteration that will have a deceitful ratio too small to
cause disagreement, such as the case depicted already at the
beginning of this proof, guaranteeing termination and safety.
For the remainder of the only if direction, we already
showed that, for f −q≥ (1− t0)n, n> q+ f must also hold.
Note now that if f −q≥ (1− t0)n then deceitful replicas do
not need any correct replica to output two disagreeing deci-
sions, meaning that this disagreement will not guarantee a
block merge nor a slashing of the provably malicious partici-
pants.
Termination. Notice however that, even if the PoF con-
sensus and slash are guaranteed to terminate and up to one
branch is guaranteed to progress, this does not mean that one
branch will necessarily progress. For example, for t0n = d n3e,
if f = q> n/3, it is immediate that no disagreements are pos-
sible, but also consensus will not terminate, given the relative
size of benign faults. It is noticeable that we can guarantee
termination for greater deceitful ratios δ≥ 1− t0, at the cost
of foregoing the resilience for up to f < t0n Byzantine faults.
Theorem A.6 (Theorem 4.3). Consider an execution in which
an ASMR is about to execute a consensus instance Γi, which
tolerates less than t0 ·n failures, where t0 ∈ (0,1). If f −q<
(1− t0)n and q< t0(n− f )1−t0 , then ASMR guarantees termination.
Proof. We consider the ASMR consensus. Since all the f −q
deceitful faults might be removed during a slash, it is neces-
sary to guarantee that among the remaining replicas after a
slash n′ = n− ( f − q) the relative size of the benign faults
is not big enough to threaten termination. Therefore, as the
number of benign faults tolerated are less than t0n′, we have
that q< t0n′ ⇐⇒ q< to(n− f +q) ⇐⇒ q< t0(n− f )1−t0 . At the
same time, if f −q≥ (1− t0)n then the deceitful replicas do
not need honest replicas to terminate, and thus correct replicas
may not ever terminate.
Confirmation of consensus. Decisions that take place
without the awareness property are suspected by honest repli-
cas to potentially require a merge, even if they will never be
undecided. Confirmations allow for honest replicas to confirm
that a particular decision will not require a merge with another
decision unknown yet. In the following theorem, we show
the number of replies honest replicas must collect in order to
confirm their decision, and discard a disagreement on that de-
cision. For example, for t0n = d n3e, if f < 2n/3 then a honest
replica must wait to receive n replies from different replicas,
otherwise it can not discard the possibility of a disagreement
on that decision.
Theorem A.7 (Theorem 4.1). Consider an execution in which
an ASMR is about to execute a consensus instance Γi, which
tolerates less than t0 ·n failures, where t0 ∈ (0,1). If a honest
replica delivers c> t0n+( f −q) decisions from replicas, it
will either confirm its decision or start a PoF consensus.
Proof. First, we consider confirmation. Suppose a process
confirms a decision when delivering c decisions from repli-
cas, then this means that c− ( f − q) of the delivered deci-
sions from must be delivered from correct replicas. Thus
n− (c− ( f − q))− ( f − q) = n− c are correct replicas for
which no decision has been yet delivered. If replicas con-
firmed their decision already, these remaining replicas must
also eventually decide the same the value. This means that the
deceitful faults could not have misled the remaining replicas to
decide on a different value: (1−t0)n≥ ( f −q)+(n−c) ⇐⇒
c > ( f − q)+ t0n. Suppose now that the deceitful replicas
managed to cause a disagreement. It is clear that a correct
replica will not be able to confirm its decision, by the above-
shown construction. Instead, when a correct replica delivers
c> ( f −q)+ t0n certificates (i.e., decisions), at least one of
the certificates will decide a different value, and thanks to
Lemma A.2 we can guarantee that, when comparing the sig-
natures of such decision to another of the received certificates
for a different decision, the correct replica will find enough
proofs-of-fraud to start a PoF consensus and a slash.
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Not. Definition
s Maximum number of transactions per block
` Maximum number of coins per block
a Maximum number of branches resulting from a disagreement
ρ Probability of success of the attack
m Number of blocks to fully refund deposit and attack depth
Ti The conflicting transaction in the ith branch
α Mapping from consensus instance to percentage of total gain
Table 4: Notations for the analysis of a zero-loss deposit.
B Analysis of Zero Loss Payment System
We show that the Longlasting Blockchain can be used to im-
plement a zero-loss payment system in that no honest replicas
lose any coin. The key idea is to request the consensus partici-
pants to deposit a sufficient amount of coins in order to spend
the coins of deceitful participants to avoid any honest replica
loss.
In order to measure the expected impact of a coalition attack
succeeding with probability ρ in forking LLB (Table 4 lists
the choice of notations), we first need to make the following
assumptions:
1. Fungible assets assumption. We assume that partici-
pants can transfer assets that are fungible in that one unit
is interchangeable and indistinguishable from another
of the same value. An example of a fungible asset is a
cryptocurrency. If assets are not fungible, we assume
that there exists a function fungibility :Da→ Ca−1×D
that, given ‘a’ conflicting decisions dP0 , ...,dPa−1 , it out-
puts only one of them dPr and a list of fungible assets
that the rest of the partitions are willing to take as a re-
fund for their decision being forgotten from that instance
on. We refer to the function fungibility as the fungibility
function. An example is a participant willing to take the
value of a product, if the product was accidentally sent to
a different participant. We assume that an honest client
does not issue conflicting transactions, i.e., concurrent
transactions that withdraw from the same account.
2. Deposit refund per block. We upper-bound the amount
of coins that can be refunded per block. Let s be the
maximum number of transactions per block. Note that
this limit is imposed by classic blockchains system [34,
39] in the form of block size [34] or gas limit [39]. As
the amount of coins that can be spent per transaction is
bounded, it follows that the amount that is refunded per
block is also upper bounded. We denote the maximum
amount of deposit per account that can refunded per
block as `. This limit implies that transferring a large
amount can be done only across m blocks (until the
corresponding portion of the deposit is fully refunded)
that we refer to as the depth of the attack. We will show
that we ensure zero loss when m≥ aρ1−ρ .
3. Network control restriction. We need to prevent
Byzantine replicas from communicating infinitely faster
than honest replicas. To this end, we assume the ratio of
the communication time of the two slowest Byzantine
replicas over the communication time of the two fastest
honest replicas (of different partitions) is lower bounded
in expectation. More formally, let X1 (resp. X2) be the
random variables that indicate the time it takes for a
message between two replicas within the same partition
(resp. two honest replicas from different partitions). We
have E(X1)/E(X2)> ε, where ε> 0. Note that the defi-
nition of X1 also implies that it is the random variable of
the communication time of either two honest replicas of
the same partition or two Byzantine replicas.
Below we show that attackers will always lose at least as
much than they manage to steal.
Theorem B.1 (Theorem 6.1). Given ρ the probability of suc-
cess of an attack, if m ≥ aρ1−ρ , then LLB implements a zero
loss payment system.
We now compute the probability ρ of a coalition attack
succeeding in forking LLB and the probability of failure ρˆ=
1− ρ. Out of one attack attempt, the attacker may gain G
coins by forking or lose P coins as a punishment from the
system. In case of a successful attack, the system compensates
the coin losses using the deposit coins. Note that P decreases
with the duration of the attack as attackers can launder they
theft by exchanging their stolen assets with non-stolen assets.
Expected gain. The attack represents a Bernoulli trial that
succeeds with probability ρ. The random variable Y that mea-
sures the number of attempts for the attack to be successful
thus follows a geometric distribution with mean E(Y ) = 1−ρˆρˆ .
The gain of an attack depends on the amount of coins
of the coalition spent in a branches of a fork. That is, the
maximum gain of a successful attack is the G · (a−1), where
G is the sum of all assets of the attacker coalition. We define
the function α : [0,m]∩Z→ [0,1] that, given an amount of
consensus instances, returns the percentage of total gain that
is refunded in that amount of instances. We consider that an
attack tries to steal an amount divisible by `, thus α(i) = im .
Expected gain and punishment. The expected gain for the
attackers in a disagreement attempt is as follows:
G(ρˆ) =(a−1) ·
(
P(Y ≥ m) ·G+
m
∑
i=0
P(Y = i) ·α(i) ·G
)
=(a−1) ·G ·
(
ρm+1 +
(1−ρ)
m
·
m
∑
i=0
iρi
)
=(a−1) ·G ·
(
ρm+1 + h(ρ)
)
.
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We can calculate the solution to the series by deriving the
solution to the power series ∑mi=0ρi and multiplying it by ρ:
m
∑
i=0
iρi = ρ ·
(
d
dρ
m
∑
i=0
ρi
)
=
ρ
(
mρm+1− (m+1)ρm+1)
(p−1)2 .
Similarly, we derive the expected punishment:
P (ρˆ) =
m
∑
i=0
P(Y = i) · (1−α(i)) ·G
=
( m
∑
i=0
P(Y = i)−
m
∑
i=0
P(Y = i) ·α(i)
)
·G
=
( m
∑
i=0
ρi(1−ρ)−h(ρ)
)
·G
=
(
(1−ρm+1)−h(ρ)
)
·G.
Deposit needed for zero loss. We refer to the expected
deposit flux per attack attempt as the difference ∆= P (ρˆ)−
G(ρˆ) between the punishment and the gain from an attack.
Therefore, the deposit flux is:
∆(ρˆ) =
(
1−a · (h(ρ)+ρm+1))G= g(a,ρ,m)G.
If ∆< 0 then the cost is G(ρˆ)−P (ρˆ), otherwise the pun-
ishment is enough to fund the deposit, so we have to ensure
that ∆≥ 0, hence we are interested in g(a,ρ,m)≥ 0, which
implies:
1−a·
(
(1−ρ)
m
· ρ
(
mρm+1− (m+1)ρm+1)
(p−1)2
)
−a ·ρm+1≥ 0.
And recall that m≥ aρ1−ρ , hence we have:
1− (mρm+1− (m+1)ρm+1)−a ·ρm+1 ≥ 0
⇐⇒ (m+1)ρm−ρm+1(a+m)≥ 0
⇐⇒ (m+1)−ρ(a+m)≥ 0
⇐⇒ m+1≥ mρ+aρ
⇐⇒ 1+ 1
m
≥ ρ+ aρ
m
⇐⇒ 1+ 1−ρ
aρ
≥ ρ+1−ρ
⇐⇒ 1≥ ρ.
This holds for 0≤ ρ< 1 for any a≥ 2, hence guaranteeing
that ∆ ≥ 0. We can conclude that LLB implements a zero-
loss payment system if the total deposit to be refunded in
a consensus instance is limited to C3m , where C is the total
circulating supply, since attackers will always lose at least as
much as they manage to steal.
If c = ρ1−ρ then m ≥ a · c, and to prevent any multiple-
disagreement up until some deceitful ratio δ, LLB guarantees
zero-loss if it limits the maximum amount to refund per con-
sensus instance to:
l ≤ C ·δ
m
And since m is expressed as a function of a, we can express
also δ as a function of a using Theorem A.1, calculating ` to
ensure zero-loss if not more than a branches are possible:
l ≤ C · 2a−3
(3a−3) ·a · c
Notice that it follows that LLB needs to limit the same
refund amount per account for every consensus instance to
prevent both 3 branches to refund and 2 branches ` ≤ C6c ,
if their probability of success is the same. Additionally, to
prevent any from a 6 branches to a double-disagreement, the
maximum amount to refund per consensus instance must be
` ≤ C10c . In this case, one can delay confirmation m ≥ 3c
blocks to guarantee zero-loss with up to 3 branches (i.e.,
f −q< 5n/9), or instead m≥ 6c with up to 6 branches (i.e.,
f −q< 3n/5).
C Coalition Attack Against Consensus
Here we describe the coalition attack of sufficiently many
deceitful replicas that leads honest replicas to a disagreement.
First, we restate the accountable consensus protocol of ASMR,
Polygraph [9].
Polygraph. Polygraph [9] executes a reliable broadcast to
exchange consensus proposals and then a binary consensus for
each of these proposals. The reliable broadcast guarantees that
each honest replica reliably delivers the same values. As each
binary consensus instance outputs the same value at all correct
replicas, applying the resulting binary decisions bin-decisions
as a bitmask over the reliably delivered values, leads to SBC-
Agreement (Def. 2). To provoke a disagreement, deceitful
replicas have two strategies: equivocating during the reliable
broadcast so as to deliver different proposals at distinct honest
replicas or equivocating during the binary consensus so as to
make distinct honest replicas decide 0 while other decide 1,
leading to different bitmasks.
Attacking the reliable broadcast. Polygraph applies a re-
duction from a consensus among n replicas to n binary con-
sensus among n replicas. In each binary consensus, a different
replica broadcasts a proposal to all the other replicas, after
which the replicas must decide to include that proposal in
their decision (1) or not (0).
To this end, an accountable reliable broadcast securely en-
sures that, as long as q < n/3, all replicas deliver the same
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value from the reliable broadcast, only if f −q< n/3, other-
wise at least fd deceitful replicas will be detected. A coalition
attack on the reliable broadcast consists of all honest repli-
cas deciding the same binary value (i.e., 1) but on different
proposals. This is not ideal for the attackers for two reasons.
First, this means that attackers of the reliable broadcast can
only attack the proposals that they themselves propose but
no other proposal. Second, since replicas need to locally vali-
date the proposals before executing the binary consensus, and
since validating proposals is the most time-consuming opera-
tion of the LLB protocol, attacking the accountable reliable
broadcast takes efforts and is of negligible impact compared
to a coalition attack that causes a disagreement on binary
consensus instances.
Attacking the binary consensus. Once replicas reliably
deliver a proposal, they start an accountable binary consensus
for such a proposal. This protocol consists of three phases:
a first phase in which participants reliably broadcast (using
a binary-value reliable broadcast called bv-broadcast) their
binary estimate (1 or 0), along with a ledger which collects
enough signatures from replicas to justify adopting such an
estimate, in a BVAL message; a second phase that starts once
replicas deliver enough estimates in phase 1, in which replicas
suggest a decision through a signed ECHO message for this
round; and a decision phase in which replicas either construct
a certificate (resp. a ledger) with enough signed ECHO to
decide and broadcast the decision (resp. adopt a new estimate
for next round), depending on the parity of both round and
estimate.
We now present the coalition attack against the binary con-
sensus that simply consists of having a sufficiently large coali-
tion of deceitful replicas running the hacked binary consensus
version depicted in Algorithm 3 instead of the correct ver-
sion of [9]. At a high level, the coalition attack consists of
collecting enough ECHO messages to be able to justify esti-
mates and decisions in both the bv-broadcast and the broad-
cast certificate. Additionally, attackers need to sign and send
ECHO messages, in order to provide correct replicas with
enough messages to continue to the next round and/or decide.
Attackers can thus use signed messages from correct replicas
across partitions if the partitions share the same bitmask for
Algorithm 3 Coalition attack at process pi
1: propose(?): B the attacker proposes anything
2: while true do
3: broadcast_vals←∅
4: for val in {0,1}\decided do B force to decide non decided value
5: if (valid(ledgerval)) then B if correct signatures or empty ledger
6: multicastPval (BVAL, 〈val, ledgerval, i〉) B send valid ledger
7: broadcast_vals.add(val)
8: wait until broadcast_vals = {0, 1}\decided
9: receive (BVAL,〈val, ledgerval, j〉)
10: if (val not in broadcast_vals) then B wait for valid ledger send
11: multicastPval (BVAL, 〈val, ledgerval , i〉)
12: broadcast_vals.add(val)
13: rec_aux←{∅,∅}, delivered←∅
14: for val in {0, 1}\decided do
15: signature← sign(val, ri, i) B create signature
16: multicastPval (ECHO[ri], 〈val,signature〉)
17: wait until decided∪delivered = {0, 1}
18: receive (ECHO[ri], 〈val,signature〉)
19: rec_aux[val].add(signature)
20: if (size(rec_aux[val])≥ n− t0 ·n− f ) then B enough val replies
21: cert← fill_certificate(val,rec_aux[val]) B coalition sign.
22: if (ri mod 2 = val and val not in decided) then B can decide
23: multicastPval (CERT[ri], 〈val,cert〉) B notification
24: decided.add(val)
25: if (decided = {0, 1}) then return B attack is done
26: else if (val not in decided) then B cannot decide this round
27: ledgerval← cert B record ledger
28: delivered.add(val),
29: r← r+1 B increment the round number
that binary consensus. We denote P0 and P1 as the sets of hon-
est replicas that attackers choose to decide 0 or 1, respectively,
for a particular binary consensus.
More precisely, at lines 4 to 12, the deceitful replicas wait
to receive a valid ledger to multicast it to each set of correct
replicas in case they do not locally have one ledger, otherwise
correct replicas will not use such a ledger (as it is not valid).
At lines 13 to 20, the deceitful replicas wait for enough ECHO
signed messages from correct replicas for each value. Once
the coalition receives enough correct replies, it can conclude
the round (lines 21 to 28) with either a certificate to multicast
(line 23) or a ledger to update for the next round (line 26),
depending on the parity of the value. The loop continues
simply to help other replicas reach a decision.
20
